There is still no guarantee that a future electoral system will ensure that elected representatives will be accountable to voters. But, then again, the search for a perfect electoral system is a chimera, writes Ivor Sarakinsky.
A
small change can have significant consequences. That is the point of the
“Butterfly Effect”, the metaphor that popularised Chaos Theory some
years back. The recent Constitutional Court decision on independent candidates
standing for election to National and Provincial Legislatures is another fine
illustration of this principle.
At one level, it seems
insignificant changing words in clauses in the Electoral Act to accommodate
independent candidates. All that needs to be done is a minor amendment, where
political party is changed to non-affiliated individual. End of story. However,
the Justices, in their wisdom, were fully aware of the implication that their
majority decision would have and gave Parliament 24 months to amend the
legislation. Why so long if it is just changing a few words?
It’s the consequences of those
few words that are incredibly complicated. At national and provincial level,
elections are held on a pure Proportional Representation (PR) system. Parties
draft lists before an election and the number of party votes determine who is
lucky enough to become an elected public representative. The incentive in this
system is to get as high up on the list as possible to increase the chance of
becoming an elected politician. This ambition must of necessity entail being
reasonably compliant to the will of the bosses who control the list process.
Citizens have nothing to do with it. It is an internal party political process.
Success here depends on strategic acquiescence, calculated obsequiousness and
absolute loyalty.
The weaknesses of the PR list
process are well known and certainly illustrative of legislative accountability
and oversight failure of the executive at national and provincial levels. It
partly explains painting nails in a special committee dealing with the Nkandla
affair, at least before the Constitutional Court had to remind Parliamentarians
that the oaths they swore before receiving their first salary cheques had quite
an important meaning. Even under lockdown, legislatures have been noticeable by
their absence in performing their constitutional functions.
All of these and many other
oversight failures, such as the all-time low Life Esidimeni tragedy, are partly
or even largely explicable by the way those in the legislature are aligned to
those in the executive through a party leadership hierarchy that has power of
their position through their control of the list.
This is not just a problem for governing parties. The same folly of political ambition and fawning at leadership for advancement is a common feature of opposition parties in South Africa. The DA has an interim leader and an election is pending. It is amusing to watch the jockeying and positioning as members sing for shadow positions by betting on the heir apparent. The EFF, on the other hand, uses the power of list control to quash any hint of internal dissent.
While it is appropriate that
independents be allowed to stand for public office, it is far from clear
whether they will be able to add value to legislative processes or even get
elected into office. Without party political institutional, organisational and
campaign machinery, plus the resources needed to stand, it is likely that very
few will be successful.
Perfect electoral system a chimera
The payment of a deposit, and the
threat of losing a large amount of money for not getting above a threshold
percentage of votes, will have a chilling effect on candidates coming forward.
Once in office, comparative experience indicates that independents vote with
one party against others. They might even lever influence for opportunistic
private gain when voting is close on a matter. Some small parties in South
African local government coalitions are examples of this possibility. This
means that the intended impact of the Constitutional Court will be marginal and
even possibly negative.
The real significance of the
Constitutional Court judgment is that it will weaken, but not dissolve, the
power of party bosses. This seems unrelated to allowing independents to stand
for election. The connection is that it is impossible to enable independents
within a pure PR system that is currently in place at national and provincial
level. The formula for representation is number of available seats allocated to
the percentage of votes each party receives. Currently, around 55 000 votes is
needed for a seat.
What happens if an independent
receives 110 000 votes, equivalent to two seats? It means that a large number
of votes are wasted and cannot be transferred. On the other hand, an
independent could get into office through the mathematics of totalling up votes
in the same way that very small parties end up with one representative in
legislatures. In both cases, there is a representative deficit.
This means that the PR system at
national and provincial level has to change. The only way that independents can
have a fair and representative opportunity to get into public office is by
winning a constituency first-past-the-post election. This means extending the
current municipal mixed system, combination of Ward and PR, to the other two
levels of government. In New Zealand, the Mixed Member Proportional system has
worked very well in straddling the divide between the excesses of pure PR and
Constituencies.
Many years back, the Van Zyl
Slabbert Committee investigated this matter and proposed exactly such a model
for South Africa when the weaknesses of pure PR had begun to manifest. It
gathered dust, until now. Party bosses were reluctant to support it in
Parliament as it would contribute to the weakening of their control of their
respective caucuses. The Constitutional Court has blasted that obstacle out of
the way. It is unfortunate that Parliamentarians avoided this issue resulting
in another judicial intervention in politics that creates added tension to an
already fraught relationship.
A yet to be decided but likely
Mixed Member Proportional type system will weaken party bosses by linking some
elected representatives directly to their voters. It will bring real
constituencies versus the current paper constituencies, where voters do not
even know who Parliament has allocated to them. This is a good thing. But there
will still be the ambitious and compliant PR list Honourable Members that will
avail themselves to the whims of leadership.
The electoral reform that must
follow will ameliorate the excesses of PR, but create a two-tier system in national
and provincial legislatures, where the PR guys act as bad cops and do party
bidding, while the constituency guys have to be popular to be re-elected.
There is still no guarantee that
a future system will ensure that elected representatives will be accountable to
voters, and act responsively and responsibly to their needs and interests. But,
then again, the search for a perfect electoral system is a chimera.
– Ivor Sarakinsky is a professor at the Wits
School of Governance.
